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COMMENTS
LIABILITY OF OWNER UNDER CAR KEY LEGISLATION
On the 10th of March, 1954, at the suggestion of Chief John W.
Polycn of the Milwaukee Police Department, in view of the alarming
growth of juvenile delinquency caused directly by car thefts,1 the
Milwaukee Common Council adopted an ordinance making it unlawful
for a person to park a passenger car and leave it unattended without
first removing the keys. The ordinance reads as follows:
"Ordinance No. 723. 1101-83.1 of the Milwaukee Code. LEAVING
OF IGNITION KEYS IN A PARKED CAR. It shall be unlawful for
any person to park a motor vehicle within the city limits of
Milwaukee that is not equipped with a lock suitable to lock either
the starting lever, throttle, steering apparatus, gear shift lever or
ignition system; furthermore, no person shall allow a motor
vehicle in his custody or control to stand or remain unattended
on any street, alley, highway or in any other public place within
the city limits of Milwaukee, except on an attended parking area,
unless either the starting lever, throttle, steering apparatus, gear
shift or ignition of said vehicle is locked and the key for such
lock is removed from the vehicle. Any person having custody or
control of a vehicle and violating any of the provisions of this
section shall upon stipulation or conviction thereof be punished
by a fine of not less than $1.00 nor more than $10.00, and in
default thereof shall be imprisoned in the House of Correction
or County Jail of and for Milwaukee County for not less than
one day nor more than ten days."
Previous to the passage of this ordinance, the Milwaukee Police
Department would leave a bright orange ticket on the windshield of
unattended cars from which keys had not been removed. The total
number of automobiles so ticketed by the members of the Milwaukee
Police Department for the period from July 1, 1947, to February 1,
1953, was 40,996. This orange ticket warned:
"90% of all cars stolen have ignition keys left in switches or
switches unlocked!
60% of all thefts are by juveniles!
You are encouraging juvenile delinquency when you leave your
key in a parked car 1"
It should also be noted that the number of car thefts are on the in-
crease. There is a 100% increase, comparing 1951 and 1952 with 1946
and 1947 in Milwaukee alone.
1 In a letter to Wisconsin Senator Bernhard Gettelman from Milwaukee's Police
Chief, John W. Polcyn, dated March 26, 1953, Chief Polcyn said: "I am con-
vinced that the absence of this law from the Statute Books of this state is one
of the greatest causes of juvenile delinquency and crime. Certainly by far
greater than that attributed to liquor, tobacco, or narcotics. Because of the
easy acquirement of the automobile on the part of the juvenile, it plays a great
part in juvenile delinquency and crime."
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MILWAUKEE POLICE DEPARTMENT
2
JUVENILE ARRESTS
AUTO THEFT
1946 - 163
1947 - 138
1948 - 232
1949 - 194
1950 - 282
1951 - 356
1952 - 352
TOTAL 1717
Almost simultaneously with the passage of Milwaukee's ordinance,
the Illinois Supreme Court in Ney v. Yellow Cab Co.,3 a case arising
under a similarly worded statute,- held a taxicab owner liable for
damages inflicted by a thief. Simply, the facts were as follows: An
employee of a taxicab company while in the scope of employment left
a taxicab unattended in a Chicago street with the motor running and
the keys in the ignition, contrary to the statute. While it was so stand-
ing, a thief stole the taxicab and in escaping struck a parked car. The
owner of the parked car sued the taxicab company to recover damages.
Judgment was entered for the owner of the parked car in the Municipal
Court, affirmed in the Appellate Court and again affirmed in the
Supreme Court, with one dissent.
The question raised by the Ney case and proposed for discussion
in this article is: Will a violator of such an ordinance be civilly liable
to one injured by the automobile while the same is being operated by a
thief. The question has two facets: (1)Is the ordinance a so-called
"safety" ordinance so that a violation of it imposes negligence per se?
(2) Is such violation a legal cause of the eventual injury?
In determining what kind of statute the legislature intended in the
Ney case, the Illinois Court looked at the location of the subparagraph
in question, which prohibited leaving keys in an unattended car, in
relation to the context of the whole paragraph. The second subpara-
graph prohibits persons under fifteen years of age from operating a
vehicle. The Court reasoned from the very fact that these two subpara-
graphs were in the same paragraph that the legislature was thinking
2 Facts and figures compiled by Milwaukee Police Department, John W. Polycn,
Chief.
32 Ill. 2d 74, 348 I1. App. 161, 108 N.E. 2d 508 (1952), 117 N.E. 2d 74 (1954).
4ILL. REV. STAT. (1953) c. 952, par. 189; "Unattended motor vehicle-Persons
under 15 not to drive. (a) No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle
shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking
the ignition and removing the key, or when standing on any perceptible grade
without effectively setting the brake thereon and turning the front wheels to
the curb or side of the highway. (b) No person shall operate or drive a motor
vehicle who is under fifteen years of age." Also sec. 92 of art. XIV of Uni-
form Traffic Act.
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about the danger to the public in permitting unqualified persons to
drive "a dangerous instrumentality", and concluded that this was a
public safety measure rather than a traffic regulation. Perhaps, if the
subparagraph relating to taking keys out of the ignition had been in-
serted in a paragraph dealing with parking as a traffic regulation, a
different result could have been reached.
In concluding just what kind of statute was intended, the Illinois
Courts in previous cases have said, it "is not to protect the owner
against theft, but is a safety measure intended to protect the public"5
(unrealistically arguing that removal of the keys does not stop a thief
from crossing ignition wires, a simple and speedy process) and "de-
signed to prevent injury which might result from children's meddling
with unattended motor vehicles". 6
Logic of this sort has rendered car owners liable in one other
jurisdiction, namely Washington, D. C., where the U. S. Court of
Appeals decided that this type of legislation is a safety statute designed
for the public safety to make the streets safer. In fixing liability, the
U. S. Court of Appeals declares that it is fairer to hold the defendant
responsible for harm than to deny remedy to an innocent victim, since
the defendant created the risk intended to be prevented, and that the
violation in itself creates liability. Two qualifications were expressed:
"This does not mean that one who violates a safety ordinance is
responsible for all harm that accompanies or follows his negli-
gence. He is responsible for the consequences of his negligence
but not coincidences." (For example, if a key was left in the
ignition and a third party loosened the brake thereby causing the
harm, the leaver of the key would not be liable.)
"Neither do we suggest that the ordinance should be interpreted
as intended to apply in all possible circumstances. In some
emergencies, no doubt, the act of leaving a car unlocked and un-
attended in a public place would not be a violation of the ordi-
nance, fairly interpreted, and would therefore entail no respon-
sibility for consequences." (Parenthetical matter ours). 7
Even in Illinois and Washington, D. C., under certain circum-
stances, no liability would attach because the acts giving rise to the
injury would be too remote from the apprehended risk. Examples of
this would be where the injury occurred twelve hours after the theft,-
or where there is insufficient evidence of foreseeability. 9 If liability
would attach regardless of intervening time or distance, the owner of
the stolen car would be an insurer to an indeterminate number of per-
5 Ostergard v. Frisch, 33 I1. App. 359, 77 N.E. 2d 537 (1948).
0 Moran v. Borden Co., 309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N.E. 2d 166 (1941).
7 Ross v. Hartman, 139 F. 2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 796,
64 S.Ct. 790, 88 L.Ed. 1080.
8 Howard v. Swagart, 161 F. 2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
9 Cockrell v. Sullivan, 344 Il. App. 320 (1916).
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sons for an indeterminate amount. It could happen that the thief
would transport the car out of town, sell it to another thief who two
months later would negligently run into a parked automobile. This
type of situation gives rise to the minority "flight doctrine", adhered
to by Illinois and Washington, D.C., which theorizes that the violator
may be liable only for damages caused by the thief in flight.
In Washington, D.C., violation of such a statute is negligence per
se, while in Illinois, it is prima facie negligence, under the decided
cases. No other jurisdictions, outside of Illinois and Washington, D. C.,
have decided the cases coming up under similar laws with so much
emphasis on legislative intent.
Massachusetts construed this type of legislation as being an anti-
theft measure, finding injury to the plaintiff not within the harm in-
tended to be prevented, stating:
"Theft of automobiles was a consequence intended to be pre-
vented. It is quite another thing to say that injuries sustained
through operation of the automobile by thieves were conse-
quences intended to be prevented."'1
Minnesota has not specifically decided whether such a law was de-
signed for the members of a particular class of the public, but the
Massachusetts view seems to be supported in Anderson v. Theisen."'
The Rhode Island court commented in Kelly v. Davis :12
".. . it is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to
abrogate the general rule that there must be a causal relationship
between the violation of a duty and the injury to render a de-
fendant liable and that such violation must be a proximate cause
of injury."
No state statute expressly rules out or includes civil liability as a
consequence of violation of the statute, and only one state, Missouri,
mentions "civil action" in the statute:
"Vernon's Mo. Stat. Ann. 1952, sec. 304.150; Unattended vehi-
cle. No person shall leave a motor vehicle unattended on the high-
way without first stopping the motor and cutting off the electric
current and no person shall leave a motor vehicle except a com-
mercial motor vehicle, unattended on the highway of any city
having a population of more than 75,000 unless the mechanism,
starting device or ignition of such motor vehicle shall be locked:
Provided, however, that failure to lock such motor vehicle shall
not mitigate the offense of stealing same, nor shall such failure
be used to defeat a recovery in any civil action for the theft of
such motor vehicle for insurance thereon, or have any other
bearing in a civil action." (Emphasis added).
10 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E. 2d 330 (1945).
"1231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W. 2d 272 (1950).
1248 R.I. 944, 135 A. 602 (1927).
23The statute is commented on in 19 KAx. Crry L. REv. 112 (1951).
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No interpretation of the wording in the Missouri statute has as yet
been attempted.'
3
The Milwaukee Common Council, while in session and in hearings,
did not discuss the extent of liability of the owner of a car when a thief
steals it and causes damages, or the intent of the ordinance in this field.
They did, however, obtain an opinion from the Commissioner of In-
surance of the State of Wisconsin that a conviction under the ordi-
nance, as it stood, would not be a policy defense under the standard
automobile theft insurance policy.'4 Later, in reply to an inquiry by the
writer, the Commissioner, in view of the devious decisions handed
down, reserved opinion concerning the liability question, saying that
the question of negligence resulting from a violation of the ordinance
would be a jury question.' 5
Milwaukee's ordinance was passed pursuant to a state enabling
statute which provides that any city may pass an ordinance requiring
passenger cars to be locked or keys to be removed from the ignition,
and imposing a fine.' 6 The history of the state statute goes back to at
least 1945,'1 when John W. Polcyn, Chief of Milwaukee Police, sup-
ported by the International Association of Chiefs of Police throughout
the nation, and the Milwaukee Metropolitan Crime Prevention Com-
mission, recommended adoption of a state law .They had in mind mak-
ing the offense stipulatable and setting the penalty at $1.75, which in-
cluded fine and costs, "the same as exists now for most parking law
violations", and permitting the offenders to pay such penalty by mail.'8
'
4 In a letter from John R. Lange, Commissioner of Insurance of the State of
Wisconsin, by G. J. Hatchell, Insurance Examiner, dated February 11, 1954 to
John F. Cook, Assistant City Attorney for Milwaukee.
15 In a letter from John R. Lange by G. J. Hatchell to writer, dated May 11, 1954.
16 WIS. STATS. (1953) §66.95:
"Prohibiting operators from leaving keys in parked motor vehicles. The
governing body of any city may by ordinance require every passenger motor
vehicle to be equipped with a lock suitable to lock either the starting lever,
throttle, steering apparatus, gear shift lever or ignition system; prohibit any
person from permitting a motor vehicle in his custody from standing or re-
maining unattended on any street, alley or in any other public place, except an
attended parking area, unless either the starting lever, throttle, steering ap-
paratus, gear shift or ignition of said vehicle is locked and the key for such
lock is removed from the vehicle; and provide forfeitures for such violations."
(Emphasis added).
Note that the statute is limited to passenger vehicles, and allows any city re-
gardless of size to enact an ordinance.
1 There are a number of newspaper articles on the subject. Milwaukee Journal:
Nov. 15, 1945; Jan. 8, 1946; Jan. 18, 1946 editorial; Feb. 10, 1946; Feb. 12,
1946; Oct. 6, 1946; Mar. 24, 1947; Apr. 10, 1947; May 28, 1947; July 13, 1947;
Aug. 4, 1947; Oct. 21, 1948; Oct. 22, 1948 editorial; Nov. 7, 1948; Feb. 10,
1949; Apr. 18, 1949; Dec. 12, 1949; Aug. 33, 1950; Aug. 10, 1950; Mar. 1, 1951;
Nov. 1, 1952 greensheet; Dec. 2, 1952; Apr. 19, 1953; Apr. 23, 1953; May 9,
1953; May 13, 1953; Feb. 2, 1954; Feb. 15, 1954; Mar. 11, 1954; Mar. 21, 1954;
May 4, 1954 letter from people column. Milwaukee Sentinel: Feb. 10, 1949;
Feb. 2, 1954.
28 Letter from Chief Polcyn to Senator Bernhard Gettelman, dated January 26,
1953, and a letter to Senator John C. McBride, dated January 31, 1947.
1954]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The Milwaukee Metropolitan Crime Prevention Commission, in Sep-
tember of 1946, issued the pamphlet, "Here, Kid, Take My Car !" In
March of 1947, they also published, "Keys Of Another Kingdom",
recommending a program of education to prohibit leaving keys in the
car, and a state law, stating that seven states and the District of
Columbia already had such laws. The 1953 Wisconsin statute is an
enabling or option statute, based on Bill 357, S., 1951 which in turn
was based on Bill 313, S., 1947.'" These two earlier Bills called for a
non-optional state-wide law, but met with opposition from rural inter-
ests, who felt it was unnecessary to lock their tractors, reporting that
there was no car theft problem in rural communities. The motor car-
riers opposed the Bill because they would have to go to great expense
to install locking mechanisms.
Throughout the history of the state legislation, in committee, by
correspondence, or on the floor of the senate or assembly, there was
no discussion relating to the liability for damage caused by a thief. Since
the legislative intent as to persons intended to be within the risk, and
as to extending absolute civil liability to the situation under discussion
has not been expressly spelled out in either our State law, or in ordi-
nances passed thereunder, it should be noted, in order to ascertain just
what persons are within the risk, that the purpose of this law is to:
1. ". . . add greatly toward the prevention of automobile thefts
thereby saving the owners a great deal of inconvenience and
assuring them of finding their automobiles where they parked
them.
2. Take away temptation from teen-agers to take these auto-
mobiles for joy rides.
3. Save the heartaches of hundreds of fathers and mothers
whose sons were arrested for automobile larceny, thereby
bringing disgrace upon the family.
20
From authorities examined and cited, it is the writer's conclusion
that safety statutes or ordinances are differentiated from general
statutes or ordinance by a comparison of the specific public dangers
attempted to be guarded against by each. It is apparent that a parking
ordinance has in view no more than the orderly flow of traffic, whereas
a speed ordinance seeks to protect the safety of the public in the use of
the highways.
Primarily then, the Milwaukee Ordinance and other similarly
worded city ordinances should be construed to be anti-theft measures
From the foregoing, the writer concludes that serious accidents, loss
of life, and property damage are incidents not intended to be covered
by the statutes and ordinances under discussion.
19 Amendment and Bill history from Wisconsin Legislative Library, M. G. Toepel,
Chief Librarian.
20 Letter from Chief Polcyn to Senator Bernhard Gettelman dated January 26,
1953.
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SOUTH CAROLINA, UTAH, AND WYOMING have simple model key
statutes. New Hampshire and Rhode Island have statutes saying the
car must be locked up, meaning keys must be removed, but do not
actually use the words "remove the keys from the vehicle." Milwaukee,
New Orleans, Kansas City (Mo.), and Minneapolis have key ordi-
nances.21 All but a few states require that when parking brakes must
be set, wheels turned toward curb on a perceptible grade, and the motor
turned off, or a combination of all of these three.22
INDIANA-In a lone Indiana case, Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 23 the court
sustained a demurrer under almost the identical facts of Ney v. Yellow
Cab Co. 23a The Indiana court found the cab company not liable, saying
that violation of the statute against leaving a key in the car was not a
proximate cause of the injury. The dicta following in this case outlines
the majority construction of a key statute.
MASSACHusETTs-Four applicable cases of importance have been
decided in Massachusetts. The most recent is Gailbraith v. Levin,24
where keys were left, as requested, on the visor, by an employee of the
defendant. A unanimous court found the owner of the unregistered
car not liable for damages caused by a thief, expressly repudiating
Malloy v. Newman,25 which erroneously found liability, and reaffirming
Slater v. T. C. Baker Co. 26
The Slater case said:
(conceding the defendant's negligence) "... the larceny and use
of the automobile by the thief were intervening independent acts
21 The following states and Washington, D. C. have key statutes: AA. CODE
(1940) Tit. 36, §27 as amended by 1949. ARr_ STATS. (1947) 76-651. COLO.
STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 16, §232. TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE REGULATIONS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, §58. IDAHO CODE (1947) §449-560.1, 1953 Supp.
ILL. REV. STATS. (1953) c. 95W, §189. Burts' IND. ANN. STATS. (1933) §47-
2124 (1952 Replacement). BALDWIN'S KEN. REv. STATS. ANN. (1943) §189. 430.
MD. CODE (1951) Art. 66r/, §212. MASS. ANN. LAWS (1954) c. 90, §13. Miss.
CODE (1942) §8219. VERNON'S MO. STATS. ANN. (1952) §304.150. N.H. REv.
LAWS (1942) c. 119, §24. N.M. STATS. (1941) §68-2460 (1953 Supp.). N.C.
GEN. STATS. (1943) §20-163. R.I. GEN. LAWS (1938) c. 88, §15. S.C. CODE
(1952) §46-491. UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) §41-6-105. WASH. STATS. ANN.
(1952) 46.48.280. Wis. STATS. (1953) §69.95. Wyo. Co~m. STAT. (1945) §60-530.
22 ARIz. CODE ANN. (1939) §66-118. CAL. VEHICLE CODE (1944) (Deering). CONN.
GEN. STATS. (1949) c. 110, §2414. DEL. CODE ANN. (1953) Tit. 21, §4147. IOwA
CODE (1950) §321.362. LA. REV. STATS. (1950) Tit. 32, §241 (D). ME. REv.
STATS. (1944) c. 19, §84. MICH. STATS. ANN. (1952) §9.2376. NEB. Rav. STATS.
(1952 Reissue) §39-759. N.J. REv. STATS. (1937) 39.4-137. N.D. REV. CODE
(1943) Vol. 4, 39-1024. ORE. Comp. L. ANN. (1940) §115-355. PURDON'S PA.
STATS. ANN. (1953)3 Tit 75, §613. S.D. CODE (1939) Vol. 3, §44.0326. Wit-
LIA 'S TENN. CODE ANN. (1934) §2691. VERNON's TEX. STATS. (1948) Art.
6701 d, §97. VT. STATS. REV. (1947) §10.251. VA. CODE (1950) §46-287. WASH.
STATS. ANN. (1952) 46.48.280.
23 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E. 3d 395 (1952).
23a Supra note 3.
24 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E. 2d 560 (1948).
25 310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E. 2d 1001 (1941). It was said in the Gailbraith case, 81
N.E. 2d at 563: "The state of being unregistered is more an abstract concep-
tion that it is a fact in nature. As a causal element it is inherently weak."
26 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778 (1927).
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which the defendant was not bound to anticipate or guard
against. Causal connection between the defendant's negligence
and subsequent injuries was broken by the thief's larceny and
use of the automobile."
Sullivan v. Griffin27 involves violation of a key ordinance where two
boys removed the keys from the ignition of an illegally parked car, gave
the keys to two other boys who then took the automobile and drove
around for an hour at reckless speeds before striking a pedestrian. The
administratrix could not recover from the car owner as the injuries
were held not be a proximate result of the defendant's negligence.
MINNE-SOTA-In Wannebo v. Gates2 it was decided on the facts,
that an accident happening several hours and five miles from the place
of theft was too remote to charge the defendant with responsibility in
spite of his violation of a Minneapolis key ordinance. Until Anderson
v. Thiesen" it was undecided in Minnesota whether a defendant would
be liable for damages caused by a thief in flight. In the Anderson case,
it was decided that the negligent driving by the thieves while fleeing in
the defendant's automobile was an intervening efficient cause, breaking
the chain of causation between the defendant's act of leaving his key in
the ignition switch (contrary to the Minneapolis ordinance) and the
collison with decedent's automobile.
Historically, in Kennedy v. Hedberg,3 0 the plaintiff administrator
was denied recovery when a car owner left his friend in the car with
the motor running when the friend started it in motion running over
and killing plaintiff's decedent. Defendant was held to have violated
Section 2632 of the Minnesota Statutes (1917), now repealed, which
provides that," No ... motor vehicle shall be permitted to remain...
unattended... with the motor running."
LOuISIANA-In Louisiana, Maggiore v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning
Service, Inc.,3 1 is the single case decided under a key ordinance. De-
fendant in this case was found liable when plaintiff pushed defendant's
unlocked truck from in front of plaintiff's blocked driveway where the
truck started up and ran over plaintiff. The court remarked it is ex-
pected people would push trucks from their driveway. Theft was not
involved.
In a later Louisiana case, Midkiff v. Watkins,3 2 although no key
statute or ordinance was violated, recovery was denied and the Mag-
giore case distinguished. In this case defendant left the keys in the
ignition, and a mentally incompetent youth stole the auto, killing
27318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E. 2d 330 (1945).
28227 Minn. 194, 34 N.W. 2d 695 (1948).
29 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W. 2d 272 (1950).
30 159 Minn. 76, 198 N.W. 302 (1924).
31 La. App., 150 So. 394 (1933).
32 La. App., 52 So. 2d 5773 (1951).
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plaintiff's decedent. In denying recovery, the court distinguished the
Maggiore case, warning against making key ordinance violators in-
surers. In future cases, including those which deal with ordinances or
statute violations, the Midkiff case will probably be followed.
In Castay v. Katz and Besthoff,33 a truck was left unattended with
the motor running. Five and one-half blocks from the parking place
the thief injured the plaintiff. No statute was violated. The court
stated that it is not to be expected or reasonably foreseen that a thief
or third party will steal or do damage. The act of the thief is a super-
seding cause.
Weiss v. King,34 followed in Midkiff v. Watkins, does not involve
a theft or key ordinance. Here the ignition was left unlocked and a
stranger pushed the car causing it to start and run across the street into
a glass window. Recovery was denied.
ILLiNois-Three Illinois cases have been decided where a key
statute was violated and the injury was inflicted by a thief in flight.
Most recently (1954) in Ney v. Yellow Cab. Co.,38 following Oster-
gard v. Frisch,5 the violator was held liable on the theory that the vio-
lation in itself creates liability, since criminal acts do not necessarily
interrupt cause and effect between negligence and injury when the theft
is foreseen. This is the prevailing rule in Illinois. Whether the violator
is liable is left for the jury. Strong dissents in both cases were founded
on the ground that flight was not shown, the defendant being liable only
when damages occur in flight.
In Cockrel v. Sullivan,38 on the ground that there was insufficient
evidence of foreseeability to get to the jury, plaintiff could not recover.
In Moran v. Borden Co.,31 where a theft was not involved, but where
the driver's children tampered with an electric milk truck, with the key
in the ignition, starting it and injuring a child, plaintiff recovered
$5000.00.
WAsHINGToN, D. C.--Oldest of the four cases arising in Washing-
ton, D. C., is Squires v. Brooks.u It found that the act of the thief was
an intervening efficient cause. Twenty-seven years later on similar facts
and law this case was overruled in Ross v. Hartman9 which found
that the act of the thief was not an intervening cause. In the Ross
case it was held that an owner of a vehicle was liable to plaintiff who
was injured when struck by the vehicle driven by a thief who stole it
33La. App., 148 So. 76 (1933).
34 La. App., 151 So. 681 (1934).
34a Supra note 3.
35 33 II. App. 359, 77 N.E. 2d 537 (1948).
z 344 Ill. App. 620, 101 N.E. 2d 878 (1951).
37309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N.E. 2d 166 (1941).
as44 App. D. C. 320 (1916).
z 139 F. 2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied 321 U.S. 796, 64 S. Ct. 790, 88 L.Ed.
1080.
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from a public alley, where it had been left unattended, with the key in
the ignition, by owner's agent, in violation of a traffic regulation.
Schaff v. Claxtoni° extended liability to the owner of a vehicle
where his employee left the truck with the key in the ignition in a
private parking space beside a restaurant. Recovery was also had in
Bullock v. Dahlstrm,41 where a lady Marine, a passenger in a cab,
stole it when the driver went to make a phone call and get cigarettes.
MARYLAND AND RHODE ISLAND--A single case in Maryland, Hochs-
child Kohn & Co. v. Canoles,42 awarded plaintiff $29,000 when an oil
truck with its motor running to pump oil rolled and struck plaintiff's
automobile. A key statute was violated, but actually negligence in that
respect was not decided. The truck had bad brakes and the truckdriver
was aware of it. The Maryland key statute has still to be tested.
Kelly v. Davis 3 is the lone case decided in Rhode Island. In that
case the defendant was found not liable when plaintiff was struck by a
car found to be properly secured by defendant. No cases involving
theft have been tried under the Rhode Island key statute.
WiscoNsiN-In Wisconsin, in order to establish negligence, it must
be determined whether the defendant lived up to a legally-imposed
standard of care, which, in the case of safety statutes and ordinances,
is the standard prescribed by the statute or ordinance. If the defendant
violated such statute or ordinance, he is guilty of negligence. Leaving
aside, now, the question of whether Milwaukee's key ordinance is a
safety ordinance, and assuming there is negligence, the next question is,
"Was the negligence the legal cause of the injury?" Legal cause is
defined as a substantial factor causing injury. It is not a question
of whether the defendant could have foreseen that his negligence
-would cause the harm or any harm. Foreseeability .is not an element
of causation. Forseeability does, however, bear on the question of inter-
vening forces. Granted that an actor is negligent, and that his negli-
gence contributed to the plaintiff's injury, the question often is whether
the defendant could have reasonably foreseen the intervening force. If
the intervening force could have been foreseen, it is not a superseding
force cutting off liability.44
Liability of a car owner who leaves his keys in a car which is stolen
by a thief who causes damage has not been decided in Wisconsin. But
a parallel line of cases have been adjudged under a comparable statute.
Section 176.30 (1) of the Wisconsin statutes is a penal statute pro-
40 144 F. 2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
146 A. 2d 370 (1946).
42 193 Md. 276, 66 A. 2d 780 (1949).
4348 R.I. 94, 135 A. 602 (1927).
44 Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931) ; Pfeifer v. Stand-
ard Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W. 2d 29 (1952); RESTATEMENT,
TORTs 441.
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hibiting sale'of liquor to an intoxicated person with a prescribed penalty
for its violation. Two cases tried under this statute have concluded that
a tavern keeper in Wisconsin who sells liquor to an intoxicated person
contrary to the law is not liable for damages caused by the vendee.45
"The cases are overwhelmingly to the effect that there is no
cause of action at common law against a vendor of liquor in
favor of those injured by the intoxication of the vendee. In
view of the common law rule, it has been necessary where opin-
ion favors the creation of such a cause of action to enact civil
damage laws.
46
"The common law holds the man who drank the liquor liable and
considers the act of selling it as too remote to be a proximate
cause of an injury caused by the negligent act of the purchaser
of the drink. '4
7
Although the sale of liquor to the person was a violation of the
statute, the Wisconsin court held that the defendant was not liable for
damages sustained since that penal statute does not expressly impose
civil liability. This leads us to the logical conclusion that the same
would be true in the case of a statute or ordinance penalizing a person
for leaving the keys in his car, and that, in order to establish liability,
an express civil liability should be imposed by the legislature.
THEFT-NO STATUTE OR ORDINANCE VIoLATED--In the absence of
a statute or ordinance, leaving a key in a car may or may not be negli-
gent, and may or many not be held to be a substantial factor in causing
the plaintiff's harm.4 The majority opinion holds the car owner not
liable, even if the damage occurs when the thief is in flight.49
CLIFFORD K. MELDMAN
45 Discussed in 1941 Wis. L. REv. 419.
4' Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 203, 268 N.W. 210 (1936).
4 Siebel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
4 Discussed in 1951 Wis. L. REv. 740.
4922 N.C.C.A. 633 and supplemental case table; 26 A.L.R. 912; 158 A.L.R. 1374
and supplemental Blue Books; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §448; 5 Am. JuiL, Auto-
mobiles, §338, p. 683.
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